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MINERAL AND SURFACE RIGHTS
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ACCRETION

PROPERTY LAW-DOCTRINE OF ACCRETION
When substantial accretion occurred before entry of the patentee
and that accreted land was not included in the patent, the patentee
does not obtain title to the accreted land. Smith v. United States,
593 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1979).
In Smith v. United States,' the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that when a "substantial" amount of land was gained
through accretion 2 prior to the entry of the person who purchased
the land from the government (patentee), that person does not
acquire the surface or mineral estates of the accreted land, unless the
government certificate of title (patent) expressly states otherwise.
The Tenth Circuit's ruling puts to rest the question of ownership for
a large amount of accreted land formed between the time of the
government survey and the issuance of the federal patent, but the
decision opens the door for a discussion of what is "substantial"
accretion.
BACKGROUND
On August 26, 1966, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
published notice of a public sale of Lots 2 and 4 in Section 33,
Township 17 North, Dewy County, Oklahoma, comprising 37.08
acres. The public sale was in accordance with the Isolated Tracts
Act, 3 which provides for the sale of public land to the highest bidder
so long as the appraisal value is met. Lot 2 was appraised at $150 for
9.53 acres and Lot 4 at $425 for 27.55 acres. On October 12, 1966,
BLM announced that Stephenson was high bidder at the appraised
value of $575. He was also the only bidder. Stephenson's purchase
was subsequently approved, and on November 21, 1966, he was
issued a patent for Lots 2 and 4. The patent stated: "Sec. 33, Lots 2
and 4. The area described contains 37.08 acres according to the
1. 593 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1979).
2. Accretion is the process by which land is gained through a slow, imperceptible depositing process by a river. THOMPSON, 5A COMMENTARIES ON MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 2561 (1957).
3. 43 U.S.C. § 1171 (1970) (repealed by 90 STAT. 2789 (1976)).
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official ... survey. . . ."' That survey was made in 1874 and described Lots 2 and 4 contiguous (riparian) to the east bank of the
South Canadian River.
In 1975, Smith filed a quiet title action in federal district court s
claiming fee title to 147.12 acres of land contiguous to the east side
of the South Canadian River. He predicated his claim on the doctrine
of avulsion.
Avulsion occurs when the land adjacent to a watercourse is sud6
denly or violently swept away and deposited in another location.
"[I]f the course of the river be changed by a sudden and violent
flood, or other hasty means and thereby a man loses his ground, it is
said that he shall have what the river has left in any other place, as
recompense for this sudden loss." 7 Hence, if Smith were to prove his
claim of avulsion, he would retain title to the 147.12 acres.
Stephenson and the United States disagreed with Smith's contention and stated that the river slowly and gradually changed its course
8
by accretion. The land gained by accretion is called "alluvion."
9
Title to the alluvion vests in the riparian owner. So if the court were
to find accretion, title to the alluvion would be in Stephenson or the
United States since their land is riparian.
The district court held: (i) changes in the course of the South
Canadian River were by accretion, (ii) the United States had title to
the mineral below the accreted land, and (iii) Stephenson had title to
the surface of the accreted land. Smith appealed the court's finding
of accretion; the United States cross-appealed, arguing that the
United States had title to the surface of the accreted land.
The Court of Appeals rejected Smith's appeal and held that accretion-avulsion was a fact question, and as such, the trial court's finding was upheld. The court examined the record and found ample
evidence to support the trial court's decision.
The more difficult but more interesting issue was the possession of
the title to the alluvion. The trial court ruled that, in the case of
alluvion, the minerals belonged to the United States, but the surface
to Stephenson. In reaching this decision, the trial court heavily relied
on Jefferis v. East Omaha Co. o0
Jefferis involved a government survey done in 1851,'' entry by
4. 593 F.2d at 986 (emphasis added).
5. Smith v. United States, No. 75-0259-E (W.D. Okla. December 9, 1975) (date of
decision).
6. Supra n. 2 at § 2560.
7. 2 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 262.
8. Supra note 2 at 2560.
9. Id; 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7.
10. 134 U.S. 178 (1890).
11. Id at 179.
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Jeffris on Lot 4 in 1853,1'2 issuance of a patent for Lot 4 in 1855,13
and conveyance from Jefferis to Sill and Town in 1856.14 The
Supreme Court made the following observations:
How much, if any, of it [alluvion] was formed between the date of
the original survey in 1851 and the time of entry in October 1853,
cannot be told; nor how much was formed between 1853 and 1856,
while the patentee [Jefferis] owned the Lot. ....
'
The Court's opinion stressed four factors in reaching the decision
that the owner of land contiguous to the river was entitled to the
alluvion. These were: (i) the date of the government survey, (ii) the
date the owner entered the land, (iii) the date the patent was issued,
and (iv) the close temporal relationship among the three criteria.
Considering these factors, the Court concluded the riparian owner
was entitled to the title of the alluvion.
The United States contended that the Jefferis rule did not apply
to this case. Jefferis was distinguished on its facts. In Jefferis, the
Supreme Court did not know how much accretion occurred between
the government survey and the patent, but the Court inferred that
any accretion between those dates was minimal. In this case, aerial
photographs taken since the government survey, 1941 through 1976,
demonstrated that substantial accretion occurred before the issuance
of the patent. 6
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on Wittmayer v.
United States. 1' In that case, the court held that a 1915 meander
survey line became the boundary of the patent, and the owner was
not entitled to the accreted land since "between the time of the
survey and the time of entry, a substantial amount of land was
formed by accretion." ' I
Wittmayer supports the Tenth Circuit's decision; however, a close
inspection of Wittmayer reveals it is materially distinguishable from
the case at bar.1 9 The government survey indicated that the land
12. Id. at 180.

13. Id
14. Id. at 180-81.
15. Id. at 191.

16. 593 F.2d at 985, 989.
17. 118 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1941).
18. Id. at 810 (emphasis in original).

19. The Wittmayer court based its decision on three cases: Mecca Land & Exploration
Co. v. Schlecht, 4 F.2d 256 (D. Ariz. 1925); Granger v. Swart, 10 F.Cas. 961 (C.C.D. Wis.
1865) (No. 5685); and United States v. Elredge, 33 F. Supp. 387 (D. Mont. 1940). Mecca
was an estoppel case where the government made improvements on unsurveyed land for
reclamation, and the government and patentee both knew that the government never in-

tended to convey the unsurveyed land. Granger involved conflicting patents. Eldredge was a
mistake of fraud case on a survey. Therefore, the legal precedent cited in Wittmayer is
tenuous at best.
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involved was an island, created by the meandering of the river. On
the west side of the island was an old river bed, which subsequently
contained flood water deposits. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the case on procedural grounds and did not address the
lower court's finding of fact.
Another case the Tenth Circuit Court relied on was Gleason v.
White.2 0 The Supreme Court held that Gleason was not entitled to
more land than the patent specifically conveyed. The 1878 patent
for 164 acres was based on an 1845 government survey but should
have referred to an 1875 survey. The 1875 survey showed an additional 160 or more acres in the area described in the patent. Gleason
knew of the 1875 survey; in fact, he requested it. So when the patent
was issued based on the 1845 survey, he was fully aware of what he
was getting. The Gleason Court did not treat this as an accretion
case, rather the Court looked at the equities involved and found for
the government.
Relying on Gleason and Wittmayer, the Tenth Circuit granted surface and mineral title to the United States. But the court cautioned
that not all accretions will vest in the United States. If this were the
holding, the judiciary would face "continuous harassing litigation
challenging the location of the water line." '2 ' The court said:
[W] e will not hold the acreage is excepted from the grant unless the
accretion is substantial, of a level of unjust enrichment, and a situation where it seems obvious the2 2government would have acted differently had it realized the error.
The court did not provide guidance to what is "substantial" accretion. The unjust enrichment theory suggests that when the amount
of accretion greatly exceeds the amount of acreage in the patent, for
instance by fourfold, then there is substantial accretion.
No court had addressed the issue of determining substantial accretion until DeBoer v. United States,2 3 a case decided after Smith and
in another circuit. The DeBoer court based its decision on the United
States Manual of Surveying Instructions2 4 which stated:
In determining what constitutes a "substantial" accretion, to which

the rule in Madison v. Basart2 ' is applicable, the area of accretion
should be compared quantitatively with the riparian lots to which it
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

199 U.S. 54 (1905).
593 F.2d at 985.
Id. at 989 (emphasis in original).
470 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Ala. 1979).
Id. at 1139.
59 I.D. 415,422 (1947) (administrative determination based on Wittmayer).
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attached. Some consideration should also be given to the total area
accreted. Accretion to a small lot might be large in proportion but
negligible in absolute size. From the standpoint of size and relative
size, the area in question can be weighed as in the case of omitted
lands. 2 6
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when "substantial"
accretion occurred prior to the entry of the patentee, title to the
accreted land remained in the United States. Nonetheless, the court
did not provide guidance for what constitutes substantial accretion.
Perhaps the best solution for courts facing the substantial accretion
doctrine is to realize that the Smith and Wittmayer decisions are
based on questionable legal precedent and to award accretions to the
riparian land owner.
M. H. SCHWARZ

26. 470 F. Supp. at 1139.

